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Firewalls are one of the key technologies used to control the trac go-
ing in and out of a network. A central feature of the rewall is the packet
lter. In this paper, we propose a complete framework for packet classi-
cation. Through two applications we demonstrate that both performance
and security can be improved.
We show that a traditional ordered rule set can always be expressed
as a rst-order logic formula on integer variables. Moreover, we empha-
size that, with such specication, the packet ltering problem is known
to be constant time (O(1)). We propose to represent the rst-order logic
formula as Interval Decision Diagrams [ST98]. This structure has several
advantages. First, the algorithm for removing redundancy and unneces-
sary tests is very simple. Secondly, it allows us to handle integer variables
which makes it ecient on a generic CPUs. And, nally, we introduce
an extension of IDDs called Multi-Terminal Interval Decision Diagrams
in order to deal with any number of policies.
In matter of eciency, we evaluate the performance our framework
through a prototype toolkit composed by a compiler and a packet lter.
The results of the experiments shows that this method is ecient in terms
of CPU usage and has a low storage requirements.
Finally, we outline a tool, called Network Access Verier. This tool
demonstrates how the IDD representation can be used for verifying access
properties of a network. In total, potentially improving the security of a
network.
∗Basic Research in Computer Science (www.brics.dk)
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1 Introduction
The Internet rewall is one of the key technologies used by network adminis-
trators for controlling access to an organizations network. The main reason
for the success is that the rewall allows centralized ltering of trac enter-
ing and exiting the protected network. The central ltering mechanism of the
rewall is the packet lter. It operates by identifying a policy by comparing
the protocol header elds of a packet with a lter specication. In this paper
we focus on the packet ltering mechanism, and in particular on how packet
lters can be improved both in terms of security and performance.
The primary aspect of packet ltering is the issue of packet classication.
Packet classication has been subject of much study in recent time, for example
see [LS98, GM99, FM00]. The reason being that the ability to classify packets
plays a central role in routing and in the Dierentiated Services Architecture.
However, the requirements to the packet classication scheme may be quite
dierent from one application to the other. One example is routing on the
Internet, where the classier is used for choosing an interface based on a routing
table. Here the classication only uses one or two of the address elds in the
packet header determine route, where a rewall may classify packets based
on any number of packet header elds TCP and/or IP. An related example
is whether the classication algorithms should support dynamic updates of
the specication or not. This is, for instance, the case with dynamic routing.
Firewalls, on the other hand, uses more static specications. An nal dierence
may be the option to use dedicated hardware or not.
Given these dierences, common performance measures of packet classica-
tion algorithms still remain. This includes classication time, space complexity,
and performance of the optimization phase. Often worst case complexities are
given in along with empirical measurements.
An other aspect of packet ltering is ability to analyze and check the lter
specication before taking it into use. Current security audits rely on perform-
ing tests on the actual network by using port scanning or more advanced tools
such as Nessus [nes]. Performing o-line security audits allow administrators
to perform complete tests of their networks and minimize the requirement to
perform test on the actual networks. However, a central issue for tool design
is that the tool is based on a strong foundation, which in the case of packet
ltering means a sound and complete representation of lter specications.
In this paper we present a packet classication scheme that is well suited
for packet ltering and can be summarized as follows:
• Sound representation of packet lters that is compatible with the tradi-
tional representation, e.g. ordered rule based lter description.
• Scalable in terms of the number of header elds, policies used in the
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specication.
• Eciently classication complexity (O(1)), assuming that the number of
bounded elds.
• Compact and static representation of lter specication using decision
diagrams.
• Access to techniques for verifying properties of lter specications.
The key idea in the packet classication scheme it to transform a tra-
ditional rule based representation of a packet lter into a boolean expres-
sion represented as a decision diagram, similar to the approach presented
in [Haz99]. However rather then using the widely known Boolean Decision Di-
agrams (BDDs) [Bry86] as in [Haz99] we use the less explored Interval Decision
Diagrams (IDDs) [ST98]. IDDs operate on integer ranges rather then booleans
thus providing the access to ecient classication of packets on generic CPUs.
However IDDs can only be used for classifying between two policies. To
alleviate this problem we introduce the concept of Multi Terminal Interval
Decision Diagrams (MTIDDs), that provide access to using any number of
policies. This extension is similar to the MTBDD extension of BDDs described
in [Bry86] which is suggested for packet classication in [AH02].
To demonstrate the potential of using IDDs for representing lter spec-
ications, we outline a tool called Network Access Verier (NAV). The key
concept of the verier is the ability perform a reachability of analysis of an
entire network, for instance proving whether the network is vulnerable to IP
spoong.
In the following sections we rst describe background and related work.
Then in Section 3 we describe our model of packet ltering. Section 4 con-
tinues by introducing IDDs and show how we represent lter specications
using IDDs. In section 5 we describe the rst of two applications which takes
advantage of the packet classication scheme. This rst application is a high
performance packet classier that provides empirical evidence showing that the
performance of the scheme corresponds to expectations. In Section 6 we out-
line the second application which is NAV, through which we demonstrate the
strength of using the IDD representation of packet lters. Finally in Section 7
we state conclusions and describe future work.
2 Related Work
In [Haz99] Hazelhurst presents the idea of transforming rewall packet lters
into boolean expressions that are represented as BDDs. The paper describes
an algorithm for transforming a Cisco rewall lter into a BDD, including the
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handling of issues with overlapping rules. The main use of BDDs in this paper
is for a tool that can be used analyzing and test lters. A later paper by Hazel-
hurst et. al [HAS00] focus on using using the BDD structures for performing
packet classication. The conclusion is that BDDs can improve the lookup
latency on systems using dedicated hardware such as FPGAs, while they do
not perform well on generic CPUs. In [AH02] Attar and Hazelhurst use N-ary
decision diagrams for improving the lookup performance. The experimental
results show that the lookup time can be signicantly improved by using this
method, however at the price of increased memory usage. Furthermore the idea
of using MTBDDs to handle the more general packet classication is suggested.
Several papers propose algorithms for packets classication on multiple
elds for generic CPUs [BMG99, FM00, Sri01, BV01].
Begel et. al [BMG99] proposes a fully general packet lter framework. Fil-
ters are specied in a declarative predicate language, that are compiled into
a ow graph, and then optimized before being executed on a virtual machine
model. Optimization is performed on the ow-graph by using redundant pred-
icate elimination for removing redundancies and rearranging non-optimal code
sequences. An interesting point is the introduction of a safety verier that
checks the validity of the programs before they are executed on the virtual
machine. This prevents the user from running programs with innite loops or
memory faults. The evaluation of the tool shows good performance. However
only with small test cases are applied.
In [BV01] Baboescu and Varghese describe a scheme called Aggregate Bit
Vector (ABV). The aim of the scheme is to provide scalable packet classication
(100,000 rules) to handle large lters while also providing ecient classication
times on generic CPUs. The scheme is an extension of the bit vector search
algorithm (BV) described in [LS98]. The rst optimization of the BV scheme
consists of minimizing the number of unused bits in the bit vectors, by taking
advantage of the observation that the number of rules overlapping in a lter is
likely to be small. This is technique referred to as aggregation. Secondly, to
take full advantage of using aggregation the order of the rules is rearranged.
However, again due to the issues of overlapping rules, it is not possible. But
by modifying the BV scheme to rst nd all matches and then computing the
lowest cost match this is made possible.
In comparison with the approach presented in this paper, both the BV
scheme and the ABV scheme solve a more general packet classication problem
the we do. The reason being that in BV and ABV issues of overlapping rules
are handled in the classication algorithm while we remove the overlap between
rules when building the decision diagram structure.
An other active area for research is on tools for managing and analyzing
lters. An example is the tool presented in [HSP00] which can be used for
detecting an resolving packet conicts in packet lters. Here a scheme is in-
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troduced to resolve packet conicts by adding resolve lters. An other tool,
presented in a paper by Eronen and Zitting [EZ01], presents a tool that uses
constraint logic programming for analyzing packet lters. Similar to the work
presented in [Haz99] this tool transforms packet lters to boolean expressions
before performing the analysis.
3 Packet Filtering
The problem of packet ltering is to match a packet header with a policy. This
decision is based only on the header of the current examined packet and a set
of rules, also called 'lter '.
The lters are dened as an ordered list of independent rules. Each rule
specify both a set of headers and what policy to apply to the packet. For ex-
ample, in Cisco-like syntax, one can dene the rule set represented on Figure 1.
access-list 108 permit tcp any any eq www
access-list 108 deny tcp any any
access-list 108 deny ip any any
Figure 1: Example of a lter in a Cisco-like syntax.
The rst rule applies the policy "permit" to any TCP packet when the
destination port is equal to "www". if the incoming packet is not matching the
rst rule, it is compared to the second one, which states that the lter apply
the policy "deny" to any TCP packet. If, again, the incoming packet is not
matched with this rule, it is compared to the last one which apply the policy
"deny" to all IP packets.
A naive approach would be to use this lter specication strait forward.
But, this way of specifying a lter is strongly dependent of the order of the
rules in the list. Keeping this order prevent a lot of possible optimizations both
in space storage for the rules set and in speed to perform the classication of
each packet.
The worst case complexity of such naive algorithm is O(n ·m), with n the
number of rules, m the number of elds to check in the header. If we assume
the number of elds as constant (as we are dealing only with known protocols
with a known number of elds), we have a linear complexity in the number
of rules (O(n)). This complexity analysis show that the number of rules has
great impact on the performance of the packet lter.
In this section we propose to consider a lter as a rst-order logic formula
on integers. We show that not only we have the same expressive power than
the ordered rule-set representation, but also that this way of specifying a lter
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allow us to deal with a constant time complexity O(1) concerning the packet
classication problem.
3.1 Specifying Filters as First-Order Logic Formula
Specifying lters as rst-order logic formula on integer variables is immediate.
In order to do it right we introduce a formal framework of the problem in order
to be able to prove formally the properties we are interested in.
Let H be the nite set of all the possible headers, and Π = (π1, π2, . . . , πp)
the set of all the policies. A rule is given by a set of headers (η ∈ P(H)1) and
a policy (π ∈ Π):
r = (η, π), with η ∈ P(H) and π ∈ Π. (1)
For example, a rule which drops the packets that have the eld 'source IP'
set to 192.134.*.* and use the protocol TCP would be written:
r = ((sip = 192.134. ∗ .∗) ∧ (proto = TCP ), DROP) (2)
We dene a lter as a set of rules over P(H) × Π:
ϕ = ((η1, πk1), (η2, πk2), . . . , (ηn, πkn)), with πki ∈ Π, ∀i ≤ n. (3)
By extension, we dene a lter ϕ = (ηi, πki)i≤n as a function that maps
one header to a set of policies. Formally, the function ϕ : H → P(Π) is dened
such that:
ϕ(h) = {πki ∈ Π/h ∈ ηi} (4)
We say that two lters ϕ and ϕ′ are equivalent i for all h ∈ H we have
ϕ(h) = ϕ′(h). And we note ϕ ≡ ϕ′
We dene a normal form lter as a lter with no duplicate policy in the
rule set. And, nally, we call a valid lter, a lter in which the set of headers
(ηi)i≤n are a partition of H. Formally a partition is dened as:
Denition 1 Let H be a set and (ηi)i≤n such that, for all i ≤ n, ηi ∈ P(H).
Then, (ηi)i≤n is a partition of H i:
1.
⋃
i≤n ηi = H,
2. ηi ∩ ηj = ∅, ∀i, j ≤ n with i 6= j.
1Where P(A) is the powerset of A.
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3.2 Ordered Filters vs First-Order Logic Filters
A lter has to be valid in order to avoid any ambiguity while the classication
of a given header. The ambiguity was previously avoided by ordering rules in
the list. This order was intended to prioritize a rule over the others, as we had
illustrated it in our rst example.
In order to prove the equivalence between an ordered lter and a rst-order
logic only lter, we have rst to dene formally what is an ordered lter.
Lets call ψ an ordered lter i ψ = (ηi, πki)i≤n with ηi ∈ P(H), πki ∈ Π
for all i ≤ n and we dene an implicit order  on the rules such that:
(ηi, πi)  (ηj , πj) ⇔ i > j (5)
By extension, we call an ordered lter ψ = (ηi, πki)i≤n a function that maps
one header to one policy. Formally, the function ψ : H → Π is dened such
that:
ψ(h) = {πki ∈ Π/h ∈ ηi and h 6∈ ηj, ∀j < i} (6)
We will now state that for any ordered lter ψ we can build an equivalent
valid lter ϕ′.
Proposition 1 For any ordered lter ψ = (ηi, πki)i≤n, we can build a lter
ϕ = (η′i, π
′
ki
)i≤n such that ψ and ϕ are equivalent.
Proof 1 The proof is strait forward from the denitions and the following
construction of ϕ:
• π′ki = πki, ∀i ≤ n,
• η′i = ηi \
⋃
j<i ηj , ∀i ≤ n.
So, ϕ′ is given by:
ϕ = ((η1, πi1),
(η2 \ {η1}, πi2),
(η3 \ {η1 ∪ η2}, πi3),
. . . ,
(ηk \ {η1 ∪ · · · ∪ ηk−1}, πik))
By construction of ϕ, this lter is valid and equivalent to ψ.
Therefore, from the proposition 1 we can deduce that our formalism is, at
least, as expressive than the current method.
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3.3 Complexity of Packet Classication
Actually, removing the need of the order in the denition of a lter has some
important consequences on the complexity of the packet classication problem.
Indeed, if we consider a normal valid lter, classifying a packet is equivalent
to evaluate a rst-order logic formula on integer variables. This operation is
known to be linear in the number of variables, or in other words in the number
of elds (m) and logarithmic in the domain of the greatest eld2 (log(w), with
w the wider ranger of the elds). Therefore, the complexity of such operation
would be O(m · log(w)). Finally, if we consider that the number of elds in
the header and the domain of each eld are bounded, then we have a constant
time complexity (O(1)).
Proposition 2 Given a normal valid lter, and a bounded number of bounded
elds, the problem of packet classication is O(1).
In conclusion, we proved that specifying a rule-set as an ordered-list or
a rst-order formula is equivalent, we even exhibit an algorithm to derive a
rst-order logic specication from any ordered list. We also shown that the
complexity of classifying a packet with a normal and valid rst-order logic
specication is constant time (O(1)). In the next section we will describe an
ecient data-structure for handling rst-order logic formula.
4 Decision Diagrams
As we pointed out in the previous section, the packet ltering problem is equiv-
alent to evaluate a rst-order logic formula. Indeed, one of the most ecient
data-structure, both in space storage and computational time, are the deci-
sion diagrams. The most famous of those are binary decision diagrams (BDD,
[And97]). Using such data-structure to represent lters have been already
investigated by S. Hazelhurst in [AH02, Haz99]. But, one main problem in
such approach is that BDD are based on boolean variables only. Therefore,
it is mandatory to consider one bit after one. As a generic CPU is used to
consider one word of several bits in one operation, there is an overhead on
extracting bits from words. In order to avoid this drawback, we chose to focus
on another decision diagram structure called interval decision diagram (IDD,
[ST98]). This structure allows us to perform classication on integer numbers
within a domain (nite of innite).
2Worst case of number of tests to perform in order to nd the position of an integer
variable on a partition
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4.1 Interval Decision Diagrams
An IDD is a DAG structure in which each node correspond to a test on an
integer variable. Each out going edge from a node is associated to an interval
within the domain of the variable attached to the node. Finally, the edge is
linked either to another node either to a boolean terminal (True or False).
More formally, the denition of an IDD node is given by:
Denition 2 Let x be an integer variable dened on the domain Dx ⊆ N and
t a rst-order logic formula on integer variables. We call t an IDD node i
one of the following hold:
• t ∈ {True, False},
• t = (x ∈ I0 ∧ t0) ∨ (x ∈ I1 ∧ t1) ∨ . . . (x ∈ Ik ∧ tk).
With (Ii)i≤k a partition of Dx and (ti)i≤k a set of IDD nodes. We note: t =
x→ (I0, t0)(I1, t1) . . . (In, tk).
We call an IDD root, an IDD node without predecessor. We say that a set
of IDD nodes (ti)i≤n is consistent if there is only one root. Moreover, if t is an
IDD node, let var(t) be the function which give the integer variable tested on
this node. More formally:
var(t) =
{
x, if t = x→ (I0, t0)(I1, t1) . . . (Ik, tk)
t, if t ∈ {True, False}
Finally, we call I = ((ti)i≤n,) an IDD i (ti)i≤n is a consistent set of IDD
nodes and  is an order on the integer variables such that for all t ∈ (ti)i≤n
with t = x→ (I0, t′0)(I1, t′1) . . . (Ik, t′k), we have x  var(t′i) for each i ≤ k.
For example, if we consider the logic formula:
(x = 0 ∧ y ≤ 3) ∨ (1 ≤ x ≤ 6 ∧ z ≤ 6) ∨ (x = 7 ∧ y = 1)
The corresponding IDD would be (see Figure 2):
t0 = x→ ({0}, t00) ([1, 6], t000) ({7}, t01)
t00 = y → ([0, 3], T ) ([4, 7], F )
t01 = y → ({0}, F ) ({1}, T ) ([2, 7], F )
t000 = z → ([0, 6], T ) ({7}, F )
IDD structures can easily be used for describing a lter. On Figure 3, we
represent a very simple lter as an IDD. This example is testing the 'source
IP' variable that we splitted into four sub-variables (sipi) which are easier to
test. It can be noticed that all non-relevant tests have been removed from the
IDD structure.
On the Figure 3 the terminal DROP is assumed to be ¬ACCEPT , as we
handle only boolean terminals. We did not represent it, because it is assumed




























Figure 3: IDD representing a ltering rule.
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4.2 Boolean Operations on Interval Decision Diagrams
As IDD are representing rst-order logic formulas on integer variables, we can
perform all the usual logical operations as negation (¬), and (∧), or (∨), and
so on. Some examples are given on Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 represent two
formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2. Figure 5 represent the result of ¬ϕ1, ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 and ϕ1 ∨ϕ2.
The edges labeled by ∗ are denoting the complement of all the other edges.
For example, if a node has four edges labeled by [0, 2], {9},[12, 15] and ∗ and













ϕ1 = (x > 9) ∧ (y < 10) ϕ2 = (x < 12) ∨ (z = 4)



























ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
¬ϕ1
Figure 5: Examples of boolean operations on IDDs.
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4.3 Optimization of Interval Decision Diagrams
As you can see on Figure 5, the result of ∧ and ∨ operations is not a direct
combination of ϕ1 and ϕ2. Indeed, some optimizations have been performed
on the structure in order to prune redundant nodes and sub-trees.
Optimization process is very simple. It is performed by listing all the node
of the IDD and applying the following optimization rules:
1. If a non-terminal node only has one outgoing edge, it must be pruned.
2. If two nodes have the same outgoing edges and represent the same vari-
able, they must be merged into one.
3. If two edges of a node, with consecutive intervals, refer to the same child,
they must be merged.
When all the nodes have been processed, the input IDD to the optimization
function is compared to the resulting IDD. If they are equal a x-point have
been reached and the optimization terminates. If not, it takes the resulting
IDD as the input and it performs the optimization function again.
This optimization algorithm is proved to always terminate (as all the rules
are pruning nodes and none is adding one). It also guaranty, both, that the
number of nodes will be minimal and that the depth of the IDD, for this given
order3, will be minimal [ST98].
4.4 Multi-Terminal Decision Diagrams
Unfortunately, in real life examples, you often have more than two policies.
One good reason could be because the rewall allow the user to create his own
policies. As IDDs are representing boolean formulas, they cannot provide more
than two terminals and therefore they can't give an ecient way of dealing
with more than two policies. The idea is now to extend the IDD structure
with multiple terminals (MTIDD). This is directly derived from the multiple
terminal binary decision diagrams (MTBDD, [And97]).
Figure 6 represent a lter which have more than two policies (ALLOW ,
RESET , DROP ). As previously, one terminal is not represented. TheDROP
policy has been chosen as the default. The precise semantic is that all the edges
which are not represented on the gure leads to the default policy.
More formally, the denition is very similar to the interval decision dia-
gram's denition, except that we allow more than two terminals. In place of
boolean as terminal we dene a nite set T of terminals (T1, T2, . . . ). Lets
rst dene a MTIDD node:
























Figure 6: MTIDD representing a ltering rule.
Denition 3 Let x be an integer variable dened on the domain Dx ⊆ N and
t a rst-order logic formula on integer variables. We call t an MTIDD node
i one of the following hold:
• t ∈ T,
• t = x→ (I0, t0)(I1, t1) . . . (Ik, tk).
With (Ii)i≤k a partition of Dx and (ti)i≤k a set of MTIDD nodes.
The notion of root node and consistency are the same, but we have to
extend slightly the function var:
var(t) =
{
x, if t = x→ (I0, t0)(I1, t1) . . . (Ik, tk)
t, if t ∈ T
Finally, we call I = ((ti)i≤n,) a MTIDD i (ti)i≤n is a consistent set
of MTIDD nodes and  is an order on the integer variables such that for all
t ∈ (ti)i≤n such that t = x→ (I0, t0)(I1, t1) . . . (Ik, tk), we have x  var(ti) for
each i ≤ k. For example (see Figure 7):
t0 = x→ ([0, 4], t00) ([5, 7], t000)
t00 = y → ([0, 3], T1) ([4, 15], T2)
t000 = z → ([0, 1], T2) ([2,+∞[, T3)
Performing packet classication on MTIDD in place of IDD does not imply
any complexity overhead and can be see as a strait extension of a regular
IDD. But, MTIDD are no more boolean formulas. In a matter of fact, we are














Figure 7: Multiple-Terminal Interval Decision Diagram (MTIDD).
In conclusion, we have presented an ecient data-structure to handle with
rst-order logic on integer variables (IDD), we described an algorithm to opti-
mize in size and depth such data-structures. And, we proposed an extension of
IDD in order to deal easily with several terminals (MTIDD). In the two next
sections we will present the general architecture of a tool using such framework
to classify packets and the basic algorithm of a network access verier tool.
5 High Performance Packet Filtering
In the previous sections we described the IDD and MTIDD data-structures
that we propose to use when performing packet ltering. This section focuses
on evaluating the performance of the data-structure by describing a prototype
tool that performs packet ltering using MTIDDs. In the following sections we
rst describe the architecture of the packet ltering toolkit and then evaluate
the performance of the tool based an number of simple experiments.
5.1 Architecture
The architecture of the packet ltering toolkit is shown in Figure 8. The main
components are the compiler, the packet classier, and the NAV tool that
we describe in Section 6. In the following we focus on describing the ow of
data through the architecture and then the issues related to the design of the
compiler and the packet classier.
Figure 8 shows the overall architecture of the packet classication tool.
The ow of data begins with a lter specication in a high level language.
In our particular case we have simply chosen to use a Cisco-like access list
language that supports overlapping rules and logging. Using a compiler the
high-level specication is transformed into an MTIDD that has been optimized
thus ensuring near optimum performance. After the compilation there are two
directions for the data. Either the MTIDD can be used in a tool such as NAV,












Figure 8: Packet Filter Architecture.
The compiler performs the transformation from the high-level lter speci-
cation into a MTIDD structure as we described it in Section 3.2. The overall
approach consists of building an IDD for each of the policies used in the lter
specication. These IDDs are then merged into an MTIDD representing the
entire lter in a single decision diagram. An example is the result of compiling
the lter specication in Figure 1. This results in an MTIDD built from two
disjoint IDDs representing the policies: PERMIT and DENY . At a more
detailed level, the compiler operates by building an IDD for each of the rules
in the order they are stated in the specication. Then, before adding an rule
to the IDD with the corresponding policy, any overlap with previous rules is
removed. This is done by removing any overlap between the current rule and
the IDDs representing various policies used in the lter. This corresponds to
the equivalence proof given in Section 3.2. For instance, from the example of
Figure 1, when adding the second rule to the IDD representing DENY , we
remove the part of the rule which overlaps with the IDD of the PERMIT
policy.
Having described the main idea of the compiler we move on and look closer
at the design of the packet classier. As shown on Figure 8 an actual im-
plementation packet classier will run in kernel space and serve as the core
classication mechanism in a packet lter, however, in the prototype we chose
only to do a user space implementation. The majority of code consists of
initializing the MTIDD data-structure describing the ltering policy. To rep-
resent the MTIDD we used a structure fairly similar to the a adjacency-list
representation of directed acyclic graphs described in [Sed02], with the excep-
tion that adjacency-lists are arrays, thus allowing fast search of the partitions.
Figure 10 illustrates the organization of this structure based on the example
15
IDD shown in Figure 9. To limit the processing overhead, each node is ini-
tialized to have a pointer to a comparison function which is used to perform a
binary search for the matching partition entry. This allows us to use dierent
functions based on the size of the header eld without any processing over-
head. The worst case number of comparisons necessary to classify a packet is:
m · log(w)) where m is the number of elds and w is the maximum number
of intervals in the largest eld. The actual search function simply consists of
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Figure 10: Organization of an IDD structure in the packet classier.
The main strength of this architecture is that the whole complexity of
packet ltering lies is in the compiler that runs in user-space while packet clas-
sier, that run in kernel space, is very simple. A consequence of this design is
that the ltering policy is more static since any change requires recompilation
of the lter specication. On the other hand compiling that lter specication
before actually loading it to the rewall allows an administrator to have the l-
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ter checked before it is taken into production. This process could be supported
by a tool such as NAV (see Section 6) or similar.
5.2 Performance
The relevance of proposing the use of the MTIDD structure for packet classi-
cation is highly dependent on whether performance is competitive with other
algorithms for packet classication that performs well on generic CPUs. How-
ever, we should emphasize that the possibilities of optimizing time and space
requirements when using MTIDD structures are many and not fully explored
in the work presented here. In the following we rst focus on the space re-
quirements of the packet classier, then we look briey at the performance of
the compilation from lter specication to MTIDD.
The memory requirements of using MTIDDs are dicult to reason about
due to the nature of decision diagrams. The worst case memory requirement
of an MTIDD is exponential in the depth of the MTIDD. However the advan-
tage of decision diagrams, in general, is that they remove any redundancy of
boolean expressions hereby minimizing the memory requirements. Secondly,
the strength of IDDs, in particular, is that boolean expressions over intervals
or ranges can be described in a very compact manner.
Indeed, ranges and intervals often occur in lter specications. For instance
if we briey look a lter on TCP/IP protocol elds then we can easily identify
often occurring intervals. For instance it is common to only allow inbound
trac on a few port numbers, so the range from 1024-65535 could for instance
be an often occurring interval to specify the range of closed ports. An other
example is the IP-address elds where we often group networks by subnet mask,
which in itself describes a grouping of addresses. A nal example is the protocol
eld in the IP header, where only a few dierent values are used for specifying
protocols such as TCP, UDP, ICMP, and IGMP. Thus we can conclude that it
is unlikely to see exponential memory requirements for representing lters.
To provide empirical evidence of the memory requirements needed for rep-
resenting packet lters as MTIDDs we performed two experiments. The rst
experiment consists of analyzing the memory requirements of a set of real-life
lters specications from production networks. The second experiment aims at
studying the scalability of the memory requirements by exploring the memory
requirements of a lter that species the trac of a backbone header trace.
For the rst experiment we studied a set of six real-life lters. The lters are
all used on production networks and manually written by professional network
administrators (e.g. no automatic rule generation is used). The lters Ax
are access lters from the University routers while lters Bx are lters from a
commercial organization.
Table 1 shows the summary of the memory requirements for each of the
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Filter #Rules #Nodes #Edges Size Time
B1 132 142 771 16.5 KB 4.8 s
A1 129 164 1255 24.8 KB 7.7 s
B3 90 53 274 6.00 KB 0.31 s
A2 71 97 605 12.5 KB 2.8 s
A3 39 18 109 2.33 KB 0.16 s
B2 18 62 259 6.05 KB 0.19 s
Table 1: MTIDD resource requirements of real-life lters.
lters. The rst column two describes the number of rules in the original lter
specication. Columns three and four summarizes size of resulting MTIDD,
and column ve shows the memory usage of the MTIDD structure when has
been loaded into the packet classication prototype. It should be mentioned
that in this study we chose to split the representation of IP addresses into four
variables, each representing a byte of the address separately. This may mean
fewer edges but more nodes.
To some degree we see a correspondence between the number of rules in
the order rule set specication and the memory requirements of the MTIDD
representation. However in the case of B3 a lter of 90 rules is represented with
less memory than lter B2 which only has 18 rules. The reason is that lter B3
has many very similar rules. Another interesting remark is that lter A1 uses
signicantly more memory than lter B1, even though the number of rules are
nearly identical. Indeed, the author of lter A1 uses overlapping rules which
causes a higher degree of fragmentation of intervals in the resulting MTIDD.
In total, these results are promising due to the small memory requirements.
The second experiment explores the scalability of the MTIDD representa-
tion of lter specication. Due to the lack of real-life lters for this experiment,
we chose a dierent approach, where the idea is to extract a lter describing the
trac of a network backbone. An alternative approach is to generate random
rules. However, since the MTIDD data-structure relies on nding intervals in
the address range, then rules with random values will not give fair picture of
the scalability issue.
In practice the rules are generated using a packet header trace of backbone
trac4. Each header in the trace is described by a rule. The rule permits
packets with similar headers elds to pass through the lter. The set of header
elds considered are source and destination address, IP protocol eld, and
source and destination port numbers if applicable. Any duplicate rules are
removed from the nal lter.
4IP addresses were mangled to ensure privacy, but it such a way that the oset between


















Figure 11: Memory requirements with large packet lters.
Figure 11 shows the result of the scalability experiments by showing the
size of the MTIDD when loaded by the packet classication prototype as a
function of the number of rules in the lters. Overall we see a logarithmic
growth rate. Initially growth rate is rather large, but as the lters increase in
size the more ecient the MTIDD data-structure becomes at representing the
lters. An important point to these experiments is that the generated lters
only represent MTIDDs with the policies permit and deny. If more policies are
added, then the size of the MTIDDs will increase. The worst-case situation,
when adding more policies, is that each new policy introduced is represented
entirely by it's own subtree, thus causing linear increase of memory usage as a
function of the number of policies in the MTIDD.
Before concluding, we briey discuss the compilation times for transforming
an rule-based lter to an MTIDD. The compile times, measured on a 1.1GHz
AMD AthlonTM, are shown in rightmost column of Table 1. From these we see
acceptable compilation times for our real-life lters, however, compiling larger
lters such as those shown in Figure 11 takes unacceptably long. For instance,
the largest lter (50.000 rules) took several days to compile. Thus we conclude
that to make our scheme truly scalable, techniques for improving the compile
time needs to be developed.
In this limited evaluation of the packet classication prototype, the empir-
ical evidence shows that:
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• The memory requirements of MTIDDs for representing real-life packet l-
ters has proven to be quite small. Our largest example used only 24.8KB
when loaded.
• When using MTIDDs for describing the headers of backbone trac, we
found that the space requirements were logarithmic in the number of
rules of the lter.
• Compilation time is acceptable with real-life lters, but dierent opti-
mization possibilities need to be explored for making the compilation
time acceptable with larger lters.
In total, our evaluation suggests that the use of MTIDDs for representing
packet lters is eective and competitive. However, it should be noted that
the evaluation is not complete in any way. For instance, we have not explored
the potential gain of variable reordering our IDD structures, such as described
in [And97]. Neither have we made attempts to measure the speed of the
classication algorithm when ltering trac.
6 Network Access Verier
A problem when working with lters specications such as those used on re-
walls is to ensure that the policy implemented in the specication corresponds
to the intended policy. An even more dicult problem is to understand the
cumulative eect of two lters separated onto dierent routers or rewalls.
In this section we outline a tool called a Network Access Verier (NAV) that
can be used to explore the access properties of a complex network by taking
advantage of the lter specications as being rst-order logic expressions. As
previously, the rst-order logic formulas are represented as IDDs.
To illustrate the idea, consider the model of a network as a bidirectional
graph as shown in Figure 12. The network consists of a set of computers,
denoted from A to E, that have one or more interfaces that connects the
computer to one or more of its neighbors. Network access is controlled through
in inbound and an outbound lter for each interface. The lters are a boolean
expressions that either permit (True) or deny (False) packets to pass through
based on values in the header elds. To include aspects of routing in the model
we transform the routing table into a set of boolean expressions, one for each
lter. Each boolean expression is given by the routing table entries for that
particular interface, thus the boolean expression describes the set of headers
that are forwarded on that interface.
Using this model we derive a matrix describing the lter between any of
pair of computers in the network. As an illustration of this principle Table 2
















IAB = IA,outB ∧ IB,inA
Figure 12: Example of a Network Graph Representation.
found by combining the lters on each link between the source and destination.
A sequence of lters are combined by conjunction, and if alternative paths exist
then the lters for each path are combined with a disjunction. For instance
the lter for any packets passing from computer A to computer B is given by
IAB = IA,outB∧IB,inA thus combining the outbound lter from A to destination
computer B and Bs inbound lter for trac from A. An other example it the
lter between the two hosts A and E. Here trac can pass through either C
or D, so using disjunction we get IAE = IAB ∧ (IBC ∧ ICE ∨ IBD ∧ IED).
Destination
A B C D E
A × IAB IAC IAD IAE






C ICA ICB × ICD ICE
D IDA IDB IDC × IDE
E IEA IEB IEC IED ×
Table 2: Matrix of lters in example network.
The matrix immediately give the reachability analysis of the network. In
fact, if an element IST of this matrix is the IDD node False, the source node S
cannot send any packet to the target node T without being ltered out. This
reachability test is really wide. Indeed it cover also IP-spoofed packets.
A more reasonable query would be to ask if the machine S can reach the
machine T with packets such that the source-IP is set to the IP of S. This
operation is, actually, very easy to perform. It is enough to compute the
conjunction of IST and the IDD describing the set of headers such that the
source-IP eld is equal to the IP address of S.
More generally, the user can specify a set of headers (Iquery) and check if
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some of them (Iresult) can be sent from S to T (IST ):
Iquery ∧ IST = Iresult (7)
If Iresult is equal to False, none of the headers described in Iquery can reach T
from S.
In this section we have briey described a tool for network access verica-
tion which test for packet reachability into a, possibly, complex network. The
overall strength the tool lies in the fact that the tests are exhaustive. Mean-
ing that all cases are covered by the computation, thus improving the overall
security of the network being analyzed. Moreover, the computational power
needed to perform such verication is really low and can be performed on any
personal computer.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have focused on packet ltering on Internet rewalls, and
especially on improving both aspects of performance and security. As a result
we have proposed a formalized framework for packet classication and through
two applications we demonstrate that both performance and security can be
improved.
The central idea of this paper consists of transforming the traditional or-
dered rule based lter specications into rst order logic formulas on integer
variables, and representing these using a Multi Terminal Interval Decision Di-
agrams (MTIDDs). Performing this transformation results in several advan-
tages. First of all, the representation is sound and complete essentially pro-
viding a strong platform for building tools for testing and verifying properties
of lter specications. Secondly, the worst case classication time when using
MTIDDs is O(1) making the classication time independent of the size of the
lter specication. Thirdly, the concept of Interval Decision Diagrams is easy
to understand and provides a natural representation of lter specications.
Finally the algorithms for optimizing and manipulating IDDs are simple.
For purposes of demonstrating the strength of the framework, we have
described two applications: a packet ltering prototype and a network access
verier (NAV).
The purpose of the packet ltering prototype is to demonstrate the perfor-
mance issues related to using a decision diagram representation of packet lters
and suggesting an architecture for a packet ltering toolkit. The main benets
of the suggested architecture is that, when using this framework, the majority
of the complexity runs in user space, while the packet classier, running in
kernel space, is very simple. In terms of performance we have presented a pre-
liminary study space-usage issues. Most interesting is the empirical evidence
showing that the memory requirements for representing lters as MTIDDs are
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very promising. In the set of real-life lter specications tested the largest
used only 25KB. In a test of large packet lters we saw logarithmic space
usage as a function of the number of rules, where the largest lter required
3.1MB of memory for 50.000 rules. A second study focused on the packet l-
ter compilation time. Here we found acceptable compilation times for real-life
lters, however with larger lters compilation times are quite long. Several
issues remains open for further study, this includes measurements of actual
classication times, and exploring ways to minimize the size of the MTIDD
structures.
The second application, which is only outlined, demonstrates a potential
use of our framework for improving network security. The idea is to model
a network and all the lters. Then by issuing queries we can explore the
access properties of the network. For instance, exploring the reachability of
IP spoofed packets from one hosts to any of the destinations. The strength of
such a tool is that the tests are exhaustive and performed o-line. Moreover,
the computational complexity of exploring the network is quite low.
In total, this paper demonstrates that the use of IDDs for packet ltering
can both improve performance and security of Internet rewalls.
The most immediate extension to this work is a more elaborate analysis of
the performance issues related to using this framework for packet classication.
Especially exploring possibilities of minimizing packet classication time and
space requirements. Long term extensions includes using the framework on an
actual rewall, and implementing the Network Access Verier. More gener-
ally, an interesting aspect is to study the possibilities of using the framework
in context of related application areas. For instance, routing and Dierenti-
ated services. However this may involve extending the framework to support
dynamic updates.
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